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Abstract. Pooling and exchange of random resources may o¤er the
owners insurance and substitution. Greater e¢ciency and more stable revenues
thereby obtain. These good properties derive from a sharing rule that complies
with the core concept from cooperative production games. It is applied here to
…sheries with stochastic yield.
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1. Introduction
Most producers regard uncertain factor abundance as inconvenient. Such attitudes
could stem from commonplace risk aversion. But often they hinge on - and are
justi…ed by - the fact that some crucial factors are random and a¤ect payo¤s in
nonlinear manners. Capacity limits have for instance, sometimes the concave e¤ect
of curtailing pro…table production.
Fisheries are a case in point. Fluctuating stock sizes there oblige quota (and
gear) owners to cope with troublesome ups and downs. Those owners may of course
turn to insurance providers - or the government - and pay appropriate premium
for agreed upon indemnities. Alternatively, the same …shermen might enter …nancial
markets and hedge their bottom lines by means of various options. The merits of such
instruments notwithstanding, it remains reasonable though, that the said …shermen
also exploit own possibilities for mutual insurance to the full.
The prospects of doing so is precisely the object of this paper. Present several risk
exposed quota holders, my aim is to demonstrate here how pooling and exchange of
individual holdings opens for mutual insurance and substitution possibilities. What
come up in this context are objects shared by stochastic programming, cooperative
game theory, and insurance - in that order. To wit, …rst, coordinated optimization
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under uncertainty yields a stochastic vector of dual variables (contingent shadow
prices)associatedtosharedrandomresources. Second, those pricesgenerateaspeci…c
core solution of a so-called production game. And third, they equilibrate a market
for quota and risk exchange.
Absenceof sharingmechanisms(markets)oftengeneratesovercapitalizedorsubsidy-
dependent …sheries, featuring overexploitation of commercially important …sh stocks.
Partly to mitigate that dismal situation a preceding paper explored how core allo-
cations may come about in …sheries plagued by no uncertainty [2]. The analysis is
extended here to bring out the same sort of solutions for …sheries with stochastic
yield. Essentially, such solutions allow cooperation across both time and contingen-
cies. Important then is that individual payo¤ is determined by how own endowment
co-varies with the aggregate.1
To set the stage Section 2 demonstrates this in a simpli…ed but not quite realistic
setting. Uncertainty is there resolved in one shot, and agents prefer to wait and see.
For greater realism Section 3 extends the analysis to cover the more intricate scenario
in which agents cannot wait and see. That scenario accommodates two stages and
stepwise decisions. The …rst stage, referred to as here and now, features investment
in catch capacities when future needs are uncertain. The second stage deals with
contingent use of sunk investments. This paper adds to [22]2 by allowing two stages,
randomness in endowments, and variation in objectives, technologies or skills across
agents. For illustration, Section 4 o¤ers an example, and Section 5 concludes.
2. A Stochastic Harvesting Game
There is set I of agents, construed as ”…shermen” (or …shing nations). These are
all uncertain about which ”state of the world” ! 2 ¥ will happen next. They agree
however, on the same probability distribution p over ¥: Agent i 2 I owns a quota (a
contingent endowment) Q si(!) of marine species s2 S in state !:
This section deals with a simpli…ed setting in which every agent waits to see
what contingent activity he should undertake. Speci…cally, when (and only after)
state ! is revealed, agent i undertakes …shing e¤ort esfi(!) directed at species s
with (gear or) ‡eet type f 2 F: Since my chief concerns are here with modelling and
1Game theoretical studies of …sheries have mainly addressed problems concerning management
of transboundary and/or straddling …sh stocks (living within Exclusive Economic Zone of several
states and the adjacent high seas), [13], [14], [15], [18], [19]. The focus of the present study is
more general for several reasons: First, the cooperative harvesting game …ts all those situations
(both intra-territorial and transboundary) where two or more parties bene…t from shared use of
random resources. Second, it allows variation in objectives, endowments and technologies/skills
across parties. Third, it includes the insurance aspect from aggregated use of random resources.
Forth, it allows cooperation across both time and contingencies.
2Later studies includes e.g. van Gellekom et al [11] and Samet and Zemel [24].Quota and Risk Sharing among Fishermen 3
computations, and not with mathematical niceties, I do not hesitate in assuming that
all sets I;¥;S;F are …xed and …nite.
Bycatchis not regardedaproblem. Further, I assumethat all species are schooling
whence easy to …nd. So, stock e¤ects on harvesting costs can be ignored to good
approximation. Re‡ecting this, let ·sfi(!) denote the catchability agent i enjoys
when harvesting species s with ‡eet f in state !:3 The state dependent price (or
market revenue) rs(!) per unit of species s - and the cost csfi(!) per unit …shing
e¤ort - are treated as exogenous parameters. To simplify notations let henceforth
¼sfi(!) :=rs(!)·sfi(!)¡ csfi(!)
denote agent i’s state dependent payo¤ per unit e¤ort in ”…shery” (s;f): Note that




is separately linear in the various e¤orts esfi(!);s 2 S;f 2 F. In autarchy agent i
would face the constraints
X
f
·sfi(!)esfi(!)· Q si(!) for all s and !:
Such constraints pretty much mirror the conditions of exclusive economic zone man-
agement. Individual restrictions ofthis sortwill most likelyleadtosome ine¢ciencies.
The latter can be mitigated, at least in part, by cooperation, resource pooling and
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f2 F;i2 C·sfi(!)esfi(!) · Q sC(!) for all s,
¾
(1)
the aim being to distribute potential gains among themselves.
The characteristic function I ¶ C 7¡! vC(!) de…nes a so-called production game
[22]. It turns out that its core is empty. In fact, the game is totally balanced [7].
3Harvesting skills or catchability is determined by manifold technical factors (gear, vessel type,
knowhowetc.) that may be di¢cult to quantify. For simplicity, we tacitly assume that all knowledge
that a¤ects harvesting skills can be reduced to a single technical coe¢cient · sfi.Quota and Risk Sharing among Fishermen 4
Moreover, a core imputation can explicitly be displayed. For this, assume henceforth
that problem (1) admits a …nite value for each ! 2 ¥when C =I: Then the results
in [8] yield:
Proposition 1. (Ex post, state-dependent core allocation) Let ¸s(!) ¸ 0;s2 S; be
a set of Lagrange multipliers associated to problem (1) when C =I: In other words,
let ¸s(!);s2 S be an optimal dual solution to the linear program (1) for the instance




¸s(!)Q si(!) 8i2 I
belongs to the core of the game having characteristic function C7¡! vC(!) as de…ned
in (1). So, P
i2 Iui(!) = vI(!); and P
i2 Cui(!) ¸ vC(!) for all C ½ I: ¤
Note that this result depends on property rights being well de…ned and truthfully
reported (or publicly known). Also, there are no transaction costs.4
The game just described, happens ex post, after uncertainty has been resolved.
There is also a game ex ante, one that comes with expected values. Indeed, with an










f2 F;i2 C·sfi(!)esfi(!) · Q sC(!) for all s, !
¾
(2)
denote the maximal expected payo¤ to coalition C when pooling their quotas. The
results in [8] also imply
Proposition 2. (Ex ante, state-independent core allocation) Let ¸s(!) ¸ 0;s 2 S;
be a set of Lagrange multipliers associated to problem (2) when C =I: In other words,
let ¸s(!);s2 S be an optimal dual solution to the linear program (2) for the instance







¸s(!)Q si(!) 8i 2 I (3)
belongs to the core of the game having characteristic function C7¡! vC as de…ned in
(2). So, P
i2 Iui = vI; and P
i2 Cui ¸ vC for all C ½ I: ¤
4The onlycircumstancesthat mightjustifyabsence of transaction costs in…sheries is thatinwhich
the agents have great deal of knowledge about each other and are involved in repeat bargaining [20].
Those circumstances can be found in tribal societies and other small communities. In such a world,
transaction costs are very low because of a dense social network of interactions.Quota and Risk Sharing among Fishermen 5




¸s ¢ Q si =
X
s2 S
f(E¸s)¢ (EQ si)+cov[¸s;Q si]g 8i 2 I
makes clear that the ”cooperative value” of agent i, as seen ex ante, depends on how
much he brings in the mean to the coalition and how his contribution co-varies with
the aggregate endowment. Agents that bring much of signi…cant quotas precisely
when total abundance is scarce, will be well compensated. They o¤er some insur-
ance and stability to the cooperative enterprise. It must be emphasized though that
aggregate risks cannot be diversi…ed away by mutual insurance.
3. Two-Stage Fisheries with Capacity Choice5
The preceding analysis is extended next to a more important setting. Speci…cally,
we now let capacity be part of individual choice. The decision ei :=(e1
i;e2
i) of agent













; both being vectors. Here e1
fi accounts for i’s
investment ex ante in ‡eet type f 2 F. That decision is irreversible6 and made in
face of uncertainty about the upcoming state !. Further, e2
sfi(!) reports the total
number of round-trips undertaken ex post by ‡eet f when owned by agent i and
aimed species s2 S is state !.
Choice and constraints are no longer separable across states as in the previous
section: Any investment decision at stage 1 is non-anticipatory. As such it must
reconcile with all possible realization of ! at the second stage. Coalition C; in coping





























fi · 0 8f 2 F;!2 ¥
and e1
fi;e2
sfi(!) ¸ 0 8s2 S;f 2 F;i 2 C;!2 ¥:
(4)
Note that …xed cost are deducted from expected revenues, the unit cost of f be-
ing K fi. The …rst restriction in (4) bounds the aggregate catch of species s to
5A similar two-stage stochastic production game has been studied in [25]. The analysis adds to
previous studies concerninginvestment andallocation problems in …sheries facing stochastic revenues
[3], [9], [10], [26].
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Q sC(!) :=
P
i2 CQ si(!) in state !.7 The second restriction limits total time con-
sumption: dsfi(!) is the duration of each round-trip in state ! while D fi is the
total amount of available time for ‡eet f 2 F when owned by i: As customary, the












typical in multi-stage instances of stochastic optimization.8
Proposition 3. (Two stages core allocations with capacity choice) Let ¸s(!) and
¸
cap
f (!) ¸ 0, s 2 S;f 2 F be Lagrange multipliers associated to problem (4) when
C = I; representing shared use of quotas and capacity, respectively. Optimal ‡eet
composition and size for the joint enterprise is then found where the …xed cost of the






f (!)D fi 8f 2 F;i 2 C:







¸s(!)Q si(!) 8i 2 I (5)
which belongs to the core of the two-stage game having characteristic function C7¡!
vC as de…ned in (4). So,
P
i2 Iui = vI; and P
i2 Cui ¸ vC for all C ½ I: ¤
Note that the sharing rule in (5) does not di¤er from (3).9 Implementation is not
dependent onawrittencontract though. It may as well comeabout inadecentralized,
competitive market for …shing quotas.
4. An Example10
For simplicity, let there be only one species, one vessel type, two agents, 10 states,
and no uncertainty in revenues or costs. The matrix
Q=[Q i!] =10
·
85 70 45 18 25 40 50 78 93 80
23 35 60 95 90 70 65 40 18 20
¸
7The motivation for multiplying the …rst restriction with p(!)is to avoid having the dual solution
cum probability. Doing so has, of course, no e¤ect on the optimal value vC.
8Problems like (4) are the object of a substantial literature, e.g. [16], [23].
9It would however, if agents faced bounds of the sort K fi · ¹ K fi:
10The numerical examples in this section are solved by using the computer package AMPL. The
model …le for the cooperative optimization program is given in Appendix.Quota and Risk Sharing among Fishermen 7
records the state-dependent quotas. That is, the entry Q i! equals the amount avail-
able for agent i in state !. Both agents are embarking on …shing as a new activity.






i (!)]¡ K ie1
i
s.t. p(!)·ie2
i (!) · p(!)Q i(!) 8!
die2
i (!)¡ D ie1
i · 0 8!
and e1
i;e2
i (!) ¸ 0 8!:
(6)
Posit a uniform distribution over ¥; that is, p(!) = 0:1 for each ! 2 ¥. Let the


























with corresponding pro…t contributions (in thousands)




If fully informed about each other endowments and skills, the agents might rather
















i (!) · p(!)Q I (!) 8!
P
ifdie2
i (!)¡ D ie1
ig · 0 8!
and e1
i;e2
i (!) ¸ 0 8i;!:
Here the aggregate state-dependent quota
Q I =[Q I!] =10
£
108 105 105 113 115 110 115 118 111 100
¤
at the second stage. Cooperation increases the total number of vessels from 60 to 86
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for the two agents and thereby forming of the coalition will take place.
5. Concluding Remarks
While privatizing …sh stocks may solve the problem of ”free riding” in …sheries, the
appropriators are still left with a coordination problem: The initial allocation of
property rights is not likely to be e¢cient. And even if it was, that allocation would
probably not last long in …sheries constantly exposed to changes.
We have shownhow such parties may better themselves by applying a sharing rule
that complies withthecoresolutionconcept. Thatruleinvokes tractableoptimization
programs that allow the agents to cooperate across both time and contingencies.
Their dual solutions produce endogenous, contingent market prices that equalibrate
competitive markets. Those prices inform about individual contributions for every
possible state. As such, they de…ne a long-term contract that provides all potential
contributors with su¢cient incentives to participate.
The above results …t observations from many small-scale communities. Sustain-
ability is often secured there through successful sharing of …shing grounds, food,
services and skills [4], [5], [12], [17], [21]. The same branch of literature also docu-
ments how communal use of property rights depend on complex institutional struc-
tures and knowledge systems adapted to the environment over long time. Similar
insights have still not reached the international …shery community where property
rights tend to be exclusive. This shortcoming might be explained by the fact that
institutionalized regimes of the oceans have only been in vigor for few decades. The
appropriate institutional framework has not fully evolved yet. It seems important to




set S; # species
set F; # ‡eets
set I; # agents
set ¥; # states
param prob {¥}>=0,<=1; # probabilities
param ¼ fS;F;I;¥g; # pro…t per round-trip made by agent i when harvestingQuota and Risk Sharing among Fishermen 9
species s with ‡eet f in state !
param · fS;F;I;¥g; # catch per round-trip made by agent i when harvesting
species s with ‡eet f in state !
param K fF;Ig; # …xed cost per vessel of type f owned by agent i
param QfS;I;¥g; # i’s quota of species s in state !
param d fS;F;I;¥g; # the duration of each round-trip made by agent i when
harvesting species s with ‡eet f in state !
param DfF;Ig; # total amount of available time for ‡eet f owned by agent i
var e1 fF;Ig >=0; # number of vessels invested in ‡eet type f by agent i
var e2 fS;F;I;¥g >=0; # number of round-trips undertaken by agent i when
harvesting species s with ‡eet f in state !
maximize pro…t: sum {s in S, f in F, i in I, ! in ¥} (prob[!]*¼[s;f;i;!]
*e2[s;f;i;!])-sum {f in F, i in I} K[f;i]*e1[f;i];
subject to pooled_quotas {s in S, ! in ¥}: sum {f in F, i in I} prob[!]
*·[s;f;i;!]*e2[s;f;i;!] <=sum {i in I} prob[!]*Q[s;i;!];
subject to pooled_vessels {f in F, ! in ¥}: sum {s in S, i in I} d[s;f;i;!]
*e2[s;f;i;!]-sum {i in I} D[f;i]*e1[f;i]<=0;
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